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ABSTRACT 
Digital technologies present museums with tremendous 
opportunities to increase public access to the arts. But the 
longstanding “permissions culture” entrenched in the museum 
community—in which licenses are obtained for the use of 
copyrighted materials regardless of whether such uses are 
“fair,” such that licenses are not legally required—likely will 
make the cost of many potential digital projects prohibitively 
expensive. Ending the permissions culture is therefore critically 
important to museums as they seek to connect with diverse 
audiences in the Digital Age. In this issue brief, I argue that such 
a development will require clear and context-specific 
information about fair use that enables museum professionals to 
better understand the appropriate boundaries of fair use, and 
that a community-based code of best practices—like the College 
Art Association’s recently released Code of Best Practices for 
Fair Use in the Visual Arts—is likely the best means to achieve 
this. 
INTRODUCTION 
Digital technologies make it possible for museums to connect 
with diverse audiences in new and unprecedented ways. 1  Today art 
enthusiasts and novices alike can digitally walk through an exhibition 
without ever leaving their home;2 step into a museum and learn about 
unfamiliar works using smartphone applications and interactive displays; 
                                                        
† J.D. Candidate at Duke University School of Law, 2017; Boston College, B.A. 
Art History, 2013. I would like to extend my gratitude to Professor James Boyle, 
Lawrence Berger, and the editors of the Duke Law and Technology Review for 
their thoughtful comments and support throughout the research and writing 
process. 
1 See, e.g., Isabel Ross, Education Focused, Technology Driven: A New Kind of 
Museum, MUSEUM OF MODERN ART (July 13, 2016), https://moma.org/explore/ 
inside_out/2016/07/13/education-focused-technology-driven-a-new-kind-of-
museum/; Les Shu, Van Gogh v. Candy Crush: How Museums Are Fighting 
Tech with Tech to Win Your Eyes, DIG. TRENDS (May 1, 2015 5:00 PM), 
http://www.digital trends.com/cool-tech/how-museums-are-using-technology/. 
2 Id. 
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and curate their own digital collections of a museum’s works.3  Such 
possibilities, if they are to be turned into realities, will doubtless require 
the reproduction of an enormous quantity of copyrighted images and 
other materials. But if museums continue their current licensing practices 
into the future, the cost of doing so likely will make many of these 
endeavors prohibitively expensive.4  
For years, a “permissions culture” has pervaded the visual arts 
community.5 Reproductions of copyrighted materials have been licensed 
almost reflexively, without serious consideration as to whether obtaining 
a license to reproduce a work was legally necessary or not.6 If these 
compulsory licensing practices continue, they will substantially inflate 
the costs of digital projects—and in turn, the quantity and quality of 
digital projects will likely decline as resources allocated to their 
development are expended on unnecessary licenses. 7  Ending the 
permissions culture is therefore critically important to museums as they 
seek to connect with diverse audiences in the Digital Age. 
This issue brief proceeds as follows. In Part I, I explain that fair 
use doctrine—which permits unauthorized, unlicensed reproduction of 
copyrighted materials under certain circumstances—is essential to 
fulfilling American copyright law’s ultimate objective: the promotion of 
widespread access to knowledge and ideas. I then consider how the 
doctrine’s flexibility is at once a virtue—making it adaptable to new 
ideas and technologies—and a vice—producing uncertainty about what 
constitutes a permissible fair use, and ultimately chilling its exercise in 
the museum community. In Part II, I advocate that many common 
museum activities incorporating copyrighted materials are fair, despite 
the fact that many of these materials are licensed. This incongruity is 
largely attributable to the uncertainty that surrounds fair use doctrine, 
and to the risk-averse practices of individual institutions that, 
collectively, have entrenched a permissions culture within the industry. 
In Part III, I argue that shifting the balance toward fair use would enable 
museums to better implement digital projects, and that this shift would 
require context-specific information about fair use that would enable 
museum professionals to better understand the appropriate boundaries of 
                                                        
3 Id. 
4 PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, COPYRIGHT, PERMISSIONS, AND FAIR 
USE AMONG VISUAL ARTISTS AND THE ACADEMIC AND MUSEUM VISUAL ARTS 
COMMUNITIES: AN ISSUES REPORT 31 (2014). 
5 Id. at 24–25. 
6 This practice is referred to throughout as “compulsory licensing.” 
7 See id. at 55–56; see also Guy Pessach, Museums, Digitization and Copyright 
Law: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 1 J. INT’L. MEDIA & ENT. L. 253, 260–
63. 
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fair use. I further argue that community-based codes of best practices—
like the College Art Association’s recently released Code of Best 
Practices for Fair Use in the Visual Arts—are likely the best means of 
doing so. I then evaluate the CAA Code, and conclude that despite its 
imperfections, it is a significant step towards ending the permissions 
culture in the museum industry. Its ultimate success, however, hinges on 
a critical mass of museum professionals deciding to put its guidelines 
into practice.   
I. PROMOTING THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND THE USEFUL ARTS:  
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT AND FAIR USE  
United States copyright law was devised to fulfill a utilitarian 
purpose: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”8  
A. Copyright is a Social Bargain with a Utilitarian Aim 
The United States Copyright Act of 1976 protects “original 
works of authorship [that are] fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression” through a grant of copyright ownership that provides its 
owner with certain exclusive rights.9 This grant of copyright, however, is 
not an end in itself.10 Rather, its ultimate aim is to stimulate progress in 
the arts and sciences for the enrichment of the public.11 
Copyright is therefore understood as a social bargain between 
creators and the public.12  It seeks to strike “[a] balance between the 
interests of [creators] in the control and exploitation of their [works] . . .  
and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, 
and commerce.”13 To achieve this balance, copyright law grants authors 
and inventors “a limited and temporary monopoly” over their creations, 
providing them with certain fundamental rights over their works for a 
designated period of time.14 This limited monopoly is intended to serve 
as both an incentive and a reward for creating new works.15  In exchange, 
                                                        
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
9 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
10 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
11 Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107–
11.  
12 COLL. ART ASSOC., CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE FOR THE VISUAL 
ARTS 8 (2015) [hereinafter “CAA CODE”]. 
13 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
14 JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 
66 (2008). 
15 Sony, 464 U.S. at 429. 
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the public benefits from access to new works, and ultimately from an 
enriched public domain at the end of these works’ copyright terms.16 
B. Fair Use is Essential to Copyright’s Utilitarian Aim  
To realize copyright’s utilitarian aim, a number of limitations are 
placed on the exclusive rights of creators that allow others to make 
certain uses of their protected works without authorization. 17  These 
limitations are as important as the rights they define;18 as giving creators 
absolute control over their works would “limit, rather than expand, 
public knowledge” in some circumstances.19  
The doctrine of fair use, which permits unauthorized copying in 
some circumstances, is one such limitation. Fair use is codified in 
Section 107 of the Copyright Act, which provides:  
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such 
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, 
is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether 
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use 
the factors to be considered shall include—(1) the purpose 
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.20 
Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement.21 As 
such, a party asserting fair use has the burden to prove that his use is 
fair.22 Perhaps for this reason, fair use is sometimes characterized as “a 
narrow and grudging defense against an otherwise valid case for 
copyright infringement.23 But as the statute provides, “the fair use of a 
copyrighted work [. . .] is not an infringement of copyright” at all.24 The 
                                                        
16 Id.  
17  See BOYLE, supra note 14, at 68–69 for an explanation of additional 
limitations on intellectual property rights. 
18 Id. at 69. 
19 Leval, supra note 11, at 1110. 
20 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
21 Boyle, supra note 14, at 66. 
22 See id. 
23 Id.  
24 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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doctrine thus serves as a “crucial safety valve in the copyright system,”25 
allowing for the development of new technologies and new expressions 
of creativity that make use of existing copyrighted material that—
without fair use—would otherwise be prohibited infringement.26   
C. Fair Use is a Flexible Doctrine 
Fair use developed as an “equitable rule of reason” through the 
common law process.27 When Congress codified the doctrine through the 
enactment of Section 107, it declined the opportunity to take a “rigid, 
bright line approach to fair use.”28 Instead, it endorsed “the purpose and 
general scope of the judicial doctrine [of fair use]” with the intention that 
courts remain “free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations.”29  
As such, there is neither a “generally applicable definition” of 
fair use, nor a set of “exact rules” to determine whether a use is fair.30 
Rather, Section 107 provides “a very broad statutory explanation of what 
fair use is,” and lists “some of the criteria applicable to it.”31  In its 
preamble, Section 107 provides some examples of purposes that may be 
considered fair uses.32 These examples, however, are “illustrative and not 
limitative,” and “provide only general guidance about the sorts of 
copying that courts and Congress most commonly ha[ve] found to be fair 
uses.”33 A claim of fair use therefore requires individual consideration 
against the factors set out in the statute. The results must then be 
“weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”34  
The flexibility of fair use is one of its greatest strengths. Had 
Congress instead codified it as a “laundry list of exemptions,” it would 
have lacked adaptability, and would have quickly become “frozen and 
irrelevant in the face of innovation and social change.”35 As it stands, fair 
use accommodates invention, creation, and free expression without 
                                                        
25 PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT 
BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT 80 (2011). 
26 Anthony Falzone & Jennifer Urban, Demystifying Fair Use: The Gift of the 
Center for Social Media Statements of Best Practices, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 337, 338 (2010). 
27 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 n.31 
(1984) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65–66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679; S. REP. No. 94-473, at 65–66 (1975)). 
28 Id.  
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id.  
32 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
33 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994).  
34 Id. at 578. 
35 Falzone & Urban, supra note 26, at 338. 
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requiring constant modification of the underlying framework of 
copyright law.36 
D. Fair use is an uncertain doctrine 
While the flexibility of fair use is an essential element of its 
continued vitality, it is also critiqued as one of the doctrine’s greatest 
shortcomings.37 Flexibility means uncertainty. Standing alone, fair use 
doctrine means “very little without an understanding of the customary 
practices and habits around the kind of use in question.”38 And even then, 
it can be unclear whether a new use of existing copyrighted material is 
likely to be considered fair.39  
Recent scholarship has recognized distinctive patterns among 
fair use cases that may be helpful in evaluating whether a use is likely to 
be considered fair.40 But these broad evaluations, as Jennifer Rothman 
explains, do not adequately reassure users in individual cases. 41 “There is 
a big difference between knowing that given categories of uses tend to be 
favored for fair use . . . and knowing how a particular case will turn 
out.” 42  And in many instances, the case law points in different 
directions. 43  This unpredictability has produced a chilling effect on 
creativity and innovation across many industries, including museums and 
                                                        
36 Id. In contrast, § 108 provides specific exceptions to intellectual property 
rights for libraries and archives in certain clearly defined situations. See 17 
U.S.C. § 108 (2012). While this specificity provides helpful clarity, it has 
severely impaired § 108’s ability to adapt to the demands of the digital age, 
resulting in widespread calls for its revision. See generally Melissa A. Brown, 
Copyright Exceptions for Libraries in the Digital Age, 74 C. & RES. LIBR. NEWS 
199 (2013).   
37  See generally Lawrence Lessig, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL 
CREATIVITY 99 (2004) (ebook) (explaining that “the fuzzy lines of 
[fair use] law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means that 
the effective fair use for many types of creators is slight”).  
38 AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 25, at 24. 
39 See Leval, supra note 11, at 1107 (explaining that “[d]ecisions [in fair use 
cases] are not governed by consistent principles, but seem rather to result from 
intuitive reactions to individual fact patterns.”). 
40 See generally, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2537 (2009); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair 
Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Michael J. Madison, 
A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 
(2004). 
41  Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright’s Private Ordering and the “Next Great 
Copyright Act,” 29 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1595, 1602–03. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. 
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the broader visual arts community.44  As a result, the promise of fair use 
has in many ways gone unfulfilled.45  
II. MUSEUMS UNDER-EXERCISE THEIR  
FAIR USE RIGHTS TO THEIR OWN DETRIMENT 
Museum professionals make frequent use of copyrighted 
materials. For instance, curators include images of works of art in 
materials produced for exhibitions, and museum educators use images 
when teaching school groups. Nevertheless, there is surprisingly little 
case law on copyright issues within the museum context.46 The relevant 
case law, however, provides strong authority that copyrighted images 
and other materials may be used fairly for transformative, 
noncommercial purposes, such as the production of educational 
materials. 47   
A. Many Museum Uses are Fair 
In this section, I present an example of an increasingly typical 
museum use of copyrighted materials, and evaluate that example against 
the statutory fair use factors listed in Section 107 of the Copyright Act.48 
Imagine that a museum professional working at a nonprofit art museum 
plans to use images of copyrighted works of art in an educational 
application about a modern artist for a smartphone or other digital 
device.49 The hypothetical application includes extensive original written 
and audio educational commentary about many of the artist’s most 
famous works, thus transforming the images from mere renderings of the 
works of art into helpful visual aids in a multimedia educational essay. 
To allow visitors to closely view the works discussed, it includes images 
that exceed the small, low-resolution “thumbnail” size that was for many 
                                                        
44 See Falzone & Urban, supra note 26, at 340. 
45 Id. 
46 AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 5, at 20–23. 
47 Id. (referencing, among other cases, Prince v. Cariou, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 
2013); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 
2006); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Perfect 10 v. 
Amazon.com Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 
336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 
(1st Cir. 2000). 
48 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).  
49 This hypothetical assumes that the museum already has high-resolution digital 
images of the necessary works, which is not always the case. Museum 
professionals without access to a high-resolution image may have to pay an 
artist, an artists’ rights organization, or another museum to obtain one. This is an 
access fee. Unlike a licensing fee, an access fee is not rooted in copyright law. 
As such, payment of an access fee may be required regardless of whether an 
intended use is fair.   
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years considered the industry standard image size when relying on fair 
use.50 The application is to be made available for free download from the 
museum’s website.  
This example is not intended to be limited to smartphone 
applications, or even just to uses of images of copyrighted works of art. 
Rather, it is intended to illustrate the types of concerns likely to arise 
when evaluating any use of copyrighted materials within the museum 
context for transformative, noncommercial purposes.51  
1. The First Factor: The Purpose and Character of the Use 
Section 107 requires consideration of a number of factors that 
must be weighed together to determine whether a particular use is fair. 
The first factor considers “the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes.”52 It looks at the profit or nonprofit character of 
the secondary use, as well as whether it is educational. Nonprofit and 
educational secondary uses tend to weigh in favor of a finding of fair 
use.53 It also considers the degree to which the original is transformed 
through the secondary use. It asks whether the secondary use “adds 
something new” to the original, “with a further purpose or different 
character.”54 While “not absolutely necessary” for a finding of fair use, 
“the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance 
                                                        
50 Am. Ass’n. of Museum Dirs., POLICY ON THE USE OF “THUMBNAIL” DIGITAL 
IMAGES IN MUSEUM ONLINE INITIATIVES 2 (2011), https://perma.cc/R6JT-
5MTU. This policy was developed by the American Association of Museum 
Directors (AAMD) in 2011. Id. The AAMD revoked this policy in 2016 because 
it had become “obsolete.” Am. Ass’n. of Museum Dirs., Policy on the Use of 
“Thumbnail” Digital Images in Museum Online Initiatives (Jan. 25, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/K22B-2QXD. It was replaced with more flexible fair use 
guidelines that encourage museum professionals to use images that are 
appropriate in size for the particular use at issue. See generally Am. Ass’n. of 
Museum Dirs., GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS AND 
WORKS OF ART BY ART MUSEUMS (2016), https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/ 
document/Final%20Fair%20Use%20Guidelines%20060116.pdf [hereinafter 
“AAMD FAIR USE GUIDELINES”].  
51 The analysis that follows could be applied more or less equally to the use of 
copyrighted works of art on educational webpages, in print or digital teaching 
materials, and other noncommercial museum uses with some sort of scholarly or 
educational purpose. See AAMD FAIR USE GUIDELINES, supra note 50, at 15–18 
for additional examples of such uses, including exhibition catalogues and blog 
posts.  
52 17 U.S.C. § 107(a). 
53 See id.  
54 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
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of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against [such] a 
finding.”55  
Here, the nonprofit, educational purpose for which the 
application is created weighs in favor of a finding of fair use. Its 
transformative character also weighs in favor of such a finding; it 
includes significant textual information that contextualizes and 
comments on the images of the works it includes, “[adding] something 
new, with a further purpose or different character.”56 As such, this factor 
weighs heavily in favor of a finding of fair use. 
2. The Second Factor: The Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
The second factor, “the nature of the copyrighted work,”57 asks 
whether the original work is within “the core of intended copyright 
protection.”58  Because copyright only protects creative expression (as 
opposed to mere facts or ideas), the more creative a work, the greater the 
scope of copyright protection it is provided.59  
Here, the works of art themselves are “original[] creative 
expression,” and thus are afforded the fullest extent of copyright 
protection. This protection extends to the derivative digital images of the 
works at issue here.60 But here, as in so many other cases, the second 
factor “does little more than confirm that the works at issue are protected 
by copyright and may only be used ‘fairly.’”61 It weighs neither in favor 
nor against a finding of fair use.   
3. The Third Factor: The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
The third factor looks at “the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”62  This 
factor calls for both a quantitative and a qualitative evaluation.63 The 
                                                        
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 17 U.S.C. § 107(b).  
58 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
59 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346–50 
(1991). In contrast, less creative works (e.g., a phone book ordering individuals 
alphabetically by last name) are afforded less protection under the copyright act, 
if they are afforded any protection at all. See id. 
60 17 U.S.C. §106 (2012). 
61 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Doc. Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1405 (6th Cir. 
1996).  
62 17 U.S.C. § 107(c). 
63 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
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more important the part or the greater the amount of the original 
reproduced, the less likely the secondary use is fair.64  
Nevertheless, there is no categorical rule against copying a work 
in its entirety or its most important part.65 As long as the secondary user 
copies only as much of the original as necessary, then this factor does not 
weigh against a finding of fair use.66 This point is particularly relevant 
when considering copyrighted images. Images, unlike text, cannot be 
adequately quoted or summarized.67 In recognition of this fact, courts 
have repeatedly held that copying entire images for transformative 
secondary uses is fair.68  
Here, it is necessary to include images of the works in their 
entirety so that users can understand the application’s commentary. As 
the application’s commentary discusses the details of the works, it is 
appropriate that the images included are large enough that users are able 
to perceive those details. This factor therefore weighs neither in favor nor 
against a finding of fair use. 
4. The Fourth Factor: The Market Effect on the Copyrighted Work  
The fourth fair use factor, “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” 69  considers 
whether the secondary use serves as a competing substitute for the 
original, thereby denying the copyright owner significant profits if 
potential purchasers acquire the secondary work in lieu of the original.70 
It inquires not only about the extent of market harm caused by the 
particular secondary use at issue, but also about the effects of 
                                                        
64 See id. at 587–89.  
65 See id. at 589. 
66 Id. 
67 See generally Stephen E. Weil, Fair Use and the Visual Arts, or Please Leave 
Some Room for Robin Hood, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 840 (2001). 
68 See, e.g., Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that the use of entire copyrighted images was reasonable in light of the 
purpose of a search engine) and Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (same); see also Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 
(1st Cir. 2000) (holding that the reproduction of entire photographs in a 
newspaper was a fair use when the news story concerned the content of the 
photographs themselves). 
69 17 U.S.C. § 107(d) (2012). 
70 Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 233 (2d. Cir 2015). 
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“unrestricted and widespread conduct” of the same sort.71  If a secondary 
use is noncommercial, it gives rise to a presumption that a use is fair.72  
The fourth factor also considers the effect of the use on the 
potential market for derivative works. 73  In the context of our 
hypothetical, this includes the market for licensing digital images of the 
works of art. The extension of copyright protection over derivative works 
“reflects a clear and logical policy choice.”74 Congress determined that a 
creator’s “right to control and profit from the dissemination of her work 
ought not to be evaded by conversion of the work into a different 
form.” 75  But the impact on the potential licensing market cannot be 
determinative. If a court concluded “in every case that potential licensing 
revenues were impermissibly impaired simply because the secondary 
users did not pay a fee for the right to engage in the use, the fourth fair 
use factor would always favor the copyright holder.” 76  Thus when 
assessing the harm to the market for derivative works, the relevant 
inquiry is whether the use is otherwise fair when compared against the 
other factors.  
Here, allowing a museum professional to make fair use of 
images of the works of art in this context arguably benefits the market 
for the original works. An image of a sculpture reproduced on an iPad 
obviously does not serve as a substitute for the sculpture itself. 
Furthermore, an application like the one at issue here likely augments the 
visibility and reputation of the artist whose work it features, thereby 
stimulating demand for his original works of art.77 
Allowing fair use in this instance would, however, deprive the 
copyright owner of a potential licensing fee for the use of the image. But 
because the application is otherwise a fair use, this should not be 
determinative. 78  Furthermore, even if reliance on fair use becomes 
widespread in this context, a substantial market for derivatives of the 
copyrighted work would remain in place. Those who wish to use the 
                                                        
71 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). 
72 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–51 
(1984). 
73 Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 223. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. As such, an artist has a copyright interest in his painting as well as a 
coextensive interest in any images that represent that painting. Id.  
76 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
77 See Olav Velthuis, TALKING PRICES: SYMBOLIC MEANINGS OF PRICES ON THE 
MARKET FOR CONTEMPORARY ART 108–09 (2005) (discussing how institutional 
recognition from museums can stimulate demand for an artist’s works).    
78 See id. 
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images in ways that are clearly not fair—such as the unimaginative, 
commercial reproduction of the work in its entirety on shirts or coffee 
mugs—will continue to have to pay licensing fees for such non-
transformative, commercial uses. The copyright owner will therefore 
continue to enjoy substantial revenue from a robust licensing market.  
5. Weighed Together in Light of the Purposes of Copyright 
The four statutory factors are not to “be treated in isolation, one 
from another.”79  Rather, all four are “to be explored, and the results 
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”80 As such, this 
analysis requires consideration of both “the benefit the public will derive 
if the use is permitted and the personal gain the copyright owner will 
receive if the use is denied.”81  
Here, this calculation weighs strongly in favor of a finding of fair 
use. The copyright owner’s interest is admittedly damaged, but it is not 
devastated; and the public benefit is substantial. By eliminating 
unnecessary costs from the creation of digital projects like the one 
imagined here, it is more likely that these projects would be attempted, 
and that the results would provide the public with more insightful, more 
comprehensive, and more innovative approaches to a diverse range of 
art. 82  These gains would be particularly substantial for distant and 
traditionally underserved audiences, as digital projects would allow those 
unable to visit a museum to access its collections. 83  As such, the 
imagined application and other, similar uses clearly advance one of 
copyright’s most essential purposes—the “promotion of broad public 
availability of . . .  [the] arts”—and are almost certainly fair.84 
a. Museum Professionals Under-Exercise Their Fair Use Rights 
While many uses of copyrighted materials in the museum 
context are fair, museum professionals are generally reluctant to assert 
this right. This reluctance stems partly from industry sensitivities. 
Museum professionals are concerned with maintaining good 
relationships with artists, their estates, and others who own the rights to 
                                                        
79 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). 
80 Id. 
81 Bill Graham, 448 F.3d at 613 (quoting MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 
183 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
82 See Lessig, supra note 37, at 113–15 (explaining that while technological 
advances have made it possible to create widespread access to scholarly and 
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their works.85  As such, museum professionals are disinclined to take 
actions that could damage those relationships, such as refusing demands 
for licensing fees. 86  Moreover, museum professionals revere artistic 
creativity, and may feel that paying licensing fees is a necessary display 
of that admiration.87 
But as in other contexts, the reluctance to exercise fair use can be 
largely attributed to the uncertainty that surrounds the doctrine. Fearing 
the threat of litigation, museum professionals have developed practices 
over the last few decades that are primarily designed to avoid potential 
conflict with rights holders, rather than to evaluate particular uses and 
invoke fair use where appropriate.88 Litigation would involve substantial 
time, money, and effort. 89  Moreover, the risks of losing would be 
significant.90 It could result in a bill for monetary damages or attorneys’ 
fees, or in a court-ordered injunction effectively erasing the museum 
professional’s work from public view.91 As such, risk-averse practices 
are understandably viewed as “cost-effective business decisions” within 
the museum industry.92  
b. The Under-Exercise of Fair Use Entrenches a “Permissions 
Culture” 
The risk-averse practices of individual institutions are especially 
problematic because, in the aggregate, they produce a vicious circle.93 
The more frequently museum professionals at a particular institution 
seek licenses “for anything and everything,” the more their peers at other 
institutions come to assume that every secondary use requires a license, 
and start to license everything themselves.94 As a result, a “permissions 
culture” has been thoroughly entrenched in the museum industry.95 Most 
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secondary uses of copyrighted material are licensed, without serious 
consideration as to whether licenses are legally necessary or not.96 
Once ubiquitous within an industry, these near-automatic 
licensing practices acquire normative significance. They are interpreted 
as the standard of acceptable behavior within a community by 
community members and outsiders alike.97 Any deviation is viewed with 
suspicion. In other industries, courts have interpreted nonconformity with 
customary licensing practices as a factor weighing against fair use, even 
when a use otherwise appears fair.98 In addition, industry gatekeepers—
such as publishers and insurers of secondary works—have been reluctant 
to release works that seek to rely on fair use, even where fair use is 
clearly appropriate. 99  
The establishment of a permissions culture within a community 
thus makes it considerably more difficult for its members to exercise fair 
use. Fair use, “like a muscle, can shrink with disuse.” 100  Without a 
critical mass of museum professionals willing to assert their right to 
make fair use, then effectively no one can. 
c. The Permissions Culture Impedes Museum Activity  
 Risk-averse licensing practices have already produced three 
distinct losses in the museum context. First are the associated monetary 
and opportunity costs.101 Significant amounts of employee and volunteer 
time are devoted to obtaining licenses for the use of copyrighted 
materials.102 These licenses can be extremely expensive.103 Depending on 
the copyright owner and the intended use of the material, licensing fees 
can range from a nominal sum to the tens of thousands of dollars.104 
Were all secondary uses first assessed for fairness—and were the 
decision then made that licenses should not be sought for uses that are 
clearly fair—museums could save themselves a considerable amount of 
human and financial resources.  
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Second are the occasions when the time and effort is expended to 
track down a rights holder, only for permission to be denied because a 
rights holder dislikes the message of a particular project, or for the 
licensing fees to be prohibitively high and the copyright owner unwilling 
to negotiate.105 Hesitant to rely on fair use, museum professionals often 
decide to excise the unauthorized materials, and to release their work in 
an incomplete or materially different format than what was preferred.106  
And lastly are the occasions when projects are not even 
attempted because of knowledge about the difficulty or expense of 
obtaining licenses from certain copyright owners. 107  These concerns 
result in an alarming amount of self-censorship within the visual arts 
field.108  More than a third of museum professionals admit to having 
avoided or abandoned a project because of the actual or perceived 
inability to obtain licenses for copyrighted materials.109 As a result, there 
are significant voids in scholarship in areas where licensing is 
prohibitively expensive or otherwise difficult.110  
Concerns about the permissions culture have taken on new 
urgency in light of digital projects’ potential to stimulate widespread 
interest in the arts.111 It is now possible to create virtual counterparts to 
traditional exhibitions that enable remote visitors to virtually experience 
the curatorial narrative.112 Works of art and archival materials otherwise 
unavailable can now be made accessible through online databases, which 
greatly expands the utility of these materials for scholars, artists, and the 
public at large.113 Digitization also preserves these materials for future 
generations.114 
If existing licensing practices extend into the digital era, 
however, it will almost certainly impede museums from implementing 
these possibilities. 115  Digital-based projects typically require an 
enormous number of images and archival materials.116 If these materials 
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are still under copyright, then these projects will likely be unfeasible for 
those unwilling to exercise their fair use rights. As Patricia Aufderheide 
and Peter Jaszi write, these losses “affect not only today’s future 
professionals, [but also] those worldwide who cannot obtain digital 
access to inspiration that could influence and shape their artistic and 
career choices.”117 This lack of access is a loss that is felt not only in the 
present. It is also “the erasure of a possible future.”118 
III. SHIFTING THE BALANCE TOWARD FAIR USE 
Given the toll that the permissions culture takes on scholarship 
and innovation in the museum context, it is in the collective best interest 
of museum professionals—and ultimately the general public—to bring 
compulsory licensing practices to an end.119 Shifting the balance toward 
fair use would enable museums to undertake more projects to increase 
public access to the arts, and to do so at a higher speed and lower cost.120 
This cultural shift, however, is not likely to occur unless the largest 
inhibitor to the effective exercise of fair use—uncertainty—is 
significantly reduced.121   
A. A Context-Specific Test Case is Unlikely to Emerge 
The present record of fair use litigation in museums and the 
visual arts is sparse.122 Since fair use is a context-specific doctrine, this 
contributes to the uncertainty that surrounds its application.123 A “test 
case” that produced clear rules for the application of fair use in museums 
would undoubtedly resolve much of this uncertainty, and would enable 
museum professionals to exercise their fair use rights with greater 
confidence.124  
But as Aufderheide and Jaszi conclude, such a scenario is 
“simply wishful thinking.”125 It is unlikely that a rights holder would 
litigate an uncertain fair use question, as even if a rights holder were 
ultimately successful, a close case could reveal the utility of fair use and 
undermine his future interests.126 Moreover, fair-use decision-making is 
highly fact sensitive. It is thus improbable that a single case would yield 
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a decision that could serve as a useful guide for all future museum 
activities.127  There is also an underlying collective action problem at 
work.128 A test case would undoubtedly benefit museums as a whole.129 
But no single institution would likely receive such a large benefit that it 
would be worth incurring the potential costs of litigation on its own.130 
As such, conflicts with rights holders will likely continue to be resolved 
through less costly private compromises between individual rights 
holders and museums, and no test case will emerge. 
B. The College Art Association’s Code of Community-Based Best 
Practices May Provide Improved Fair Use Certainty  
Greater certainty can also be achieved through the development 
of codes of “best practices” for fair use. Such codes—which already have 
been adopted in other creative and academic communities—translate fair 
use principles into more understandable terms tied to the activities of its 
members.131 Because the costs of production are dispersed throughout the 
entire community, these codes are able to overcome the collective action 
problem that otherwise prevents the resolution of fair use uncertainty.132  
The College Art Association released the Code of Best Practices 
for Fair Use in the Visual Arts in February 2015.133 It parallels similar 
codes developed in other creative communities. 134  It pertains to the 
practices of museum professionals, as well as other members of the 
visual arts profession, including art historians, artists, educators, and 
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scholarly publishers. 135  It describes common activities within the 
museum and visual arts community where its members agree that the 
exercise of fair use is appropriate.136 It then defines the boundaries of fair 
use in those situations, providing users of copyrighted materials with 
useful principles on which to rely when invoking fair use.137  
1. An Overview of the Relevant CAA Code Principles 
Three of the five principles are especially relevant to the 
activities of museum professionals: (1) general museum uses, (2) online 
access in memory institutions, and (3) analytic writing. 138  These 
principles provide that museum professionals may exercise fair use when 
engaging in many routine industry activities. The first principle–general 
museum uses—provides that museum professionals may invoke fair use 
when using copyrighted materials in activities that advance their core 
missions. 139  This principle would allow a museum professional, for 
instance, to make fair use of an image of a work of art used in an 
educational application for a smart phone.140 It applies to all copyrighted 
materials—including images, text, and video—and provides that these 
materials may be reproduced fairly in both print and digital media.141  
It is subject to four categories of limitations. First, it is subject to 
a purpose and character limitation. The use “should be justified by the 
curatorial objective, and the user should be prepared to articulate that 
justification.” 142  Second, it is subject to amount and substantiality 
limitations. The amount of the copyrighted work used “should be 
appropriate to the analytic or educational purpose.”143 If a downloadable 
image is made available online, it “should be suitable in size for full-
screen projection or display on a personal computer or mobile device, but 
generally not larger.”144  Third, it is subject to oversight and security 
limitations. Images should not be made available for download “unless a 
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special justification is present,” and all materials “should be associated 
with all appropriate and reasonably available metadata.”145 Fourth, it is 
subject to limitations stemming from various sensitivities in the visual 
arts communities. Images “should be “accompanied by attribution of the 
original work as is customary in the field, to the extent possible,” and all 
materials should be reproduced at a “level of fidelity . . . appropriate to 
the analytic or educational purpose.”146 Lastly, the reproduction of any 
material “should honor institutional policies designed to protect non-
copyright interests of third parties, including the privacy of individuals 
and the cultural sensitivities of communities.”147 
The second principle—online access in memory institutions—
provides that museum professionals may invoke fair use to make 
copyrighted materials available online, as well as to make “digital 
preservation copies” for the museum’s own purposes.148 This principle 
applies to “art-related documentation” materials that are not subject to 
use restrictions imposed by donation agreements. 149  It includes such 
materials as sketches, manuscripts, and book collections of artists and 
collectors.150  
This principle is subject to essentially the same limitations as 
general museum uses.151 But there is greater emphasis on user oversight: 
the limitations provide that a website should inform users that all 
materials are provided only for personal and scholarly use, and that it 
should disclaim any liability for downstream uses of these materials.152 
Additionally, it provides that these websites should advertise “a point of 
contact for further information and correspondence.”153 These additional 
limitations are likely attributable to the relative ease with which digital 
materials can be copied and reproduced. 
The third principle—analytic writing—provides that museum 
and visual arts professionals may invoke fair use when reproducing 
copyrighted materials in analytic writing about art. 154  This principle 
applies both when the copyrighted materials are the “specific subjects of 
analysis,” as well as when the materials “are used to illustrate larger 
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points about artistic trends and tendencies.”155 It applies to writings made 
available in either print or digital formats.156  
This principle is subject to limitations that closely parallel the 
limitations associated with the previous two principles. 157  There is 
increased emphasis, however, that the analytic objective of these writings 
“should predominate over that of merely representing the work or works 
used.” 158  The limitations also caution that digital uses should be 
considered especially carefully because of the “heightened risk that 
reproductions may function as substitutes for the originals.”159  
2. The Likely Impact of the CAA Code on Fair Use in the Museum 
Industry 
The development of community-based codes of best practices 
can be tremendously beneficial for users of copyrighted materials. 
Through their limited focus on principles of fair use relevant to a 
particular community, these codes can make the doctrine more accessible 
and less abstract than more general discussions of fair use.160 As a result, 
community members are able to exercise their fair use rights with greater 
confidence. 
Codes of best practices, however, are not without their concerns. 
First, these codes are often formulated without input from all relevant 
stakeholders. 161  They usually reflect a consensus among users of 
copyrighted materials within a particular community, with little to no 
input from rights holders with countervailing interests.162 The CAA Code 
is no exception. It was created through discussions between artists, 
museum professionals, and other users of copyrighted materials within 
the visual arts community.163 Representatives from rights managements 
groups—whose core business is to license images of works of art—were 
notably absent.164  
Generally speaking, rights holders are presumably excluded from 
these discussions because of the actual or perceived difficulty of 
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achieving a consensus between rights holders and secondary users.165 But 
when agreement to common principles is not even attempted, it raises 
serious concerns about whether these statements appropriately define the 
boundaries of fair use.166  One-sided codes risk partiality. Formulated 
without serious opposition from those with countervailing interests, they 
are more likely to reflect interpretations of the law that advance their 
authors’ preferred allocation of rights, rather than a moderate and widely 
agreed upon interpretation of copyright law. In turn, more friction is 
likely to result between rights holders and secondary users when the 
principles these codes put forward are ultimately put in action. Although 
the CAA Code accurately reflects fair use case law, its invocation 
nevertheless hazards exactly this sort of resistance from rights holders. 
Rights holders—who depend on licensing fees for income—can be 
expected to push back to avoid the short-term revenue loss that the more 
frequent invocation of fair use is likely to cause.  
Second, codes of best practices do not always significantly 
clarify principles of fair use. In an effort to avoid being overly restrictive, 
they frequently do little more than restate the statutory fair use factors.167 
This is true of several of the CAA Code’s principles. For example, its 
purpose and character limitation in the context of general museum uses 
provides that a use “should be justified by the curatorial objective, and 
the user should be prepared to articulate that justification.” 168  This 
limitation merely contextualizes the question underlying the first 
statutory factor, without resolving what sort of curatorial objective 
justifies making fair use of copyrighted material. Such limitations do not 
unduly narrow the appropriate boundaries of fair use. But neither do they 
offer museum professionals with significant guidance in applying fair 
use. These vague limitations could be improved through the inclusion of 
illustrative examples. This could be done either through a formal 
revision, or through the creation of an online forum that offers further 
guidance to members of the visual arts community on appropriately 
implementing the Code’s principles.169  
Third, codes of best practices sometimes impose additional, non-
legal burdens that stem from a community’s ethical norms rather than the 
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actual law. 170  The CAA Code admittedly incorporates “widely and 
strongly held community values” that are “not tied to language of the 
Copyright Act.”171  
Most of the resulting limitations are not particularly burdensome. 
For example, in the context of general museum uses, the Code provides 
that “images provided to the public should be accompanied by attribution 
of the original work as is customary in the field, to the extent 
possible.”172 This limitation, reflecting the importance of acknowledging 
artistic creativity within the visual arts community, is easily satisfied. In 
addition, the Code explicitly states that the use of images in this context 
“should honor institutional policies designed to protect noncopyright 
interests of third parties,” such as “the privacy of individuals and the 
cultural sensitivities of communities.”173 While the right to privacy is a 
legal concern, cultural sensitivities are not. Such limitations could 
reassure museum professionals when invoking fair use that their 
behavior complies not only with the law, but also with the norms of the 
visual arts community. Overall, this could make museum professionals 
more inclined to adopt the Code’s principles than if such considerations 
were omitted.   
But some of the CAA Code’s limitations are more concerning. 
Specifically, the oversight and security limitations in the general museum 
context provide that digital images “should be associated with all 
appropriate and reasonably available metadata,” and that “downloading 
should not be facilitated unless a special justification is present.” 174 
Compliance with these requirements—neither of which are strictly 
required under Section 107—could complicate, or at least appear to 
complicate, the creation of digital applications, webpages, and other 
technologies that include copyrighted materials. This could unnecessarily 
deter museum professionals from undertaking such projects. 
But in its recent decision, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., the 
Second Circuit considered Plaintiff’s argument that the digitization of 
copyrighted books to make them searchable on Google Books may 
facilitate their pirating, thereby harming the value of their copyright.175 
The court evaluated the adequacy of the security measures that Google 
had put in place, and, finding them satisfactory, concluded that pirating 
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was unlikely and dismissed the argument.176 That does not necessarily 
indicate that an opposite conclusion would have precluded a finding of 
fair use. Nevertheless, the court stated that it “might well furnish a 
substantial rebuttal to the secondary user’s claim of fair use.”177 Thus 
while compliance with the Code’s oversight and security limitation may 
be somewhat burdensome, it is likely a sound precaution to avoid 
unintentionally overstepping the boundaries of fair use. 
The CAA Code is admittedly imperfect. But its flaws are not 
fatal. Moreover, many of them could be readily corrected through 
revision or other retroactive steps to make its principles more usable for 
museum professionals and other members of the visual arts community. 
But even if corrective measures are not taken, the CAA Code is still 
likely to produce positive change within the museum and visual arts 
community: if nothing else, its publication signals the start of an 
important conversation, of a widespread recognition of the stagnation 
that the permissions culture has produced, and of a movement towards 
something better. 178   
CONCLUSION 
The hidden costs of the permissions culture have been tolerated 
in the museum community for far too long. With interest in 
implementing digital technologies increasing, its slow sucking of 
museum resources can no longer be ignored. Continued into the future, 
the permissions culture will make many digital projects unaffordable—
impacting not only museum professionals, but also the public that they 
seek to serve.  
The publication of the CAA Code is an important step in 
bringing the permissions culture to an end in the museum community. 
But it is just one step. Ultimately, its eradication is up to museum 
professionals themselves, who must reassess their licensing practices and 
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act to establish fair use as the new normal.179 The CAA Code has set the 
stage for them to do so. But the real endeavor of expanding access to the 
arts to everyone, everywhere—which relies on fair use as but one of 
many tools—remains to be done.  
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